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Abstract 
 
Organizations increasingly find themselves contending with circumstances that are suffused 
with dynamic complexity.  So how do they make sense of and contend with this?  Using a 
sensemaking approach, our empirical case analysis of the shooting of Mr Jean Charles de 
Menezes shows how sensemaking is tested under such conditions.  Through elaborating the 
relationship between the concepts of frames and cues, we find that the introduction of a new 
organizational routine to anticipate action in changing circumstances leads to discrepant 
sensemaking.  This reveals how novel routines do not necessarily replace extant ones but 
instead, overlay each other and give rise to novel, dissonant identities which in turn can lead 
to an increase in equivocality rather than a reduction.  This has important implications for 
speed of response to unprecedented circumstances, sensemaking and organizing.   
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Introduction 
At 10.06 a.m. on Friday 22 July 2005 in London, Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by 
specialist firearms officers from the London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). He was shot 
in the belief that he was a suicide bomber in the act of denoting a concealed explosive device.  
He was shot at point-blank range using specialist ammunition intended to cause instant death 
before a person has the opportunity to trigger a bomb. At the time, Mr de Menezes had just 
boarded the carriage of a tube train in Stockwell underground station.  The carriage was 
relatively full and many members of the travelling public witnessed the event.  
The shooting was the culmination of a counter terrorist operation which had begun the 
previous day, following a series of unsuccessful suicide bomb attacks on the London public 
transport system which had led officers of the MPS to a suspect at an address in south 
London. At 4.20 a.m. on 22 July, Commander M initiated an armed police operation to 
maintain surveillance at 21 Scotia Road and safely contain and identify residents as they left 
the premises later that morning.  Mr de Menezes emerged from this address at 9.33 a.m. and 
was followed by police surveillance officers.  Some 33 minutes later, he was killed by 
specialist police firearms officers who believed he had been identified as the suspect, Hussain 
Osman.  By the end of the day, it became clear that the belief that Mr de Menezes was a 
terrorist was a mistaken one.  He was, in fact, an innocent young Brazilian electrician living 
in London, travelling to his place of work when he became caught up in a series of events 
which had a tragic outcome.   
Organizations are increasingly facing events that are variously unexpected, surprising, 
unorthodox and rare (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Cunha, Clegg and Kamoche, 2006; Lampel, 
Shamsie and Shapira, 2009).  So how do people deal with such circumstances and what 
effects does this have on their future organizing?  Through a detailed examination of the 
circumstances that culminated in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, this article will 
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show how the Counter Terrorism (CT) unit of the London MPS undertook a novel 
organizational routine to counter what was then, in the aftermath following 9/11, a novel 
terrorist tactic of suicide bombing.  The consequence of this for CT officers’ sensemaking 
and action was embodied in dissonant, novel identities.  We find that this coming together of 
three different forms of novelty – novel routines/tools, novel situations, and novel identities – 
compromised organizational sensemaking in this case.   
The sensemaking perspective is adopted here as a lens because through its use of concepts 
such as frames and cues, it addresses directly our aim of understanding events. As Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005: 410) put it, organizational sensemaking effectively explores a 
series of questions:  how does something come to be an event for organizational members?, 
what does the event mean/what is the story here?, and now what should I do?.  This paper 
addresses these questions in the context of the development of novel organizational routines 
to counter changing patterns of terrorist threat. It is important to note that we do not seek to 
add to discussions of culpability in the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes.  Like Snook’s 
(2001: 206) example of a military organizational failure when two Black Hawk helicopters 
were accidentally shot down killing twenty-six people, the tragedy resulted from “good 
people struggling to make sense”.  By adopting a sensemaking perspective, we analyse and 
account for the struggles to make collective sense in this case.   
In so doing, we make several contributions to research. First, while extant research 
stresses that the processes of organizing and sensemaking involve both thinking and acting 
(Balogun, Gleadle, Hailey and Wilmott, 2005; Rouleau and Balogun, 2011; Weick, 1979: 
1995), little consideration is given to the relative contributions of these.  We extend this by 
arguing that amidst conditions of dynamic complexity (Farjoun 2010), making sense through 
action should become more influential than making sense through thinking.  Secondly, while 
the tempo and temporality of how events are happening highlights the utility of a process 
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informed by the ontology of becoming (Chia and Holt, 2009; Clegg, Kornberger and Rhodes, 
2005; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002), we pluralise and extend this to include goings.  That is, we 
show how the integration of new frames and becomings with previous frames and goings 
(Colville, 2009; Weick, 2012) is crucial to understanding how events come into being for 
organization members, what they mean, and what they do next and why.  This leads to a third 
contribution which draws together process theorising with sensemaking and organizing, 
highlighting how novel frames, routines and identities (concepts which are central to 
sensemaking) do not merely replace extant ones but overlay each other with important 
implications regarding the speed of becoming and response to novel circumstances.  
This theorizing has important implications for all organizations which are increasingly 
caught up in and do not want to be caught out by fast-changing circumstances. The 
consequences of such events happening are all too tragically evidenced in our case.  Our 
proposition is that many organizations already do and will increasingly contend with 
circumstances of dynamic complexity as revealed and theorised here.  We therefore make a 
wider contribution, engaging both theory and practice and in so doing, follow Corley and 
Gioia’s (2011: 20) advice to identify important coming issues and social problems that need 
to be conceptualised.    
In sum, this research argues that when dealing with unexpected events in circumstances 
of complex change, organizational responses that involve high degrees of novelty can 
undermine reliable performance rather than enhance it. Translated into the language of 
organizing and sensemaking (Weick 1979; 1995), responding to unprecedented events can 
lead to an increase in equivocality rather than a reduction. We argue that such dynamic 
complexity which now characterises the times (e.g. global banking collapse in 2008, 
spontaneous yet apparently well-organized rioting on the streets of major English cities in 
2011) puts a premium on organizing processes that enable making sense of the times. 
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Our article first addresses the literature of organizing and sensemaking, and in particular, 
considers frames and cues.  Following a section on methodology, methods and data analysis, 
we then structure our discussion section around three core themes relating to: frames and 
cues, becomings and goings, and novel identities  Finally, we draw conclusions and highlight 
implications for future research and practice of organizing and sensemaking. 
 
Organizing and sensemaking 
A central theme of both organizing and sensemaking research is that people organize to make 
sense of equivocal inputs and enact this sense back in to the world to make that world more 
orderly (Weick et al, 2005: 131). Put differently, in an effort to tame the ‘wild profusion of 
things’ and to introduce a workable level of certainty or plausibility, people make informed 
bets as to ‘what is going on’ and ‘what the story is’ by ruling out a number of possibilities or 
‘might have beens’.  The distinction between reducing equivocality and ambiguity (often 
mistakenly used as synonyms) is crucial in understanding the clarifying role of action.  As 
Colville, Brown and Pye (2012: 7, emphasis in the original) point out, “Lessening ambiguity 
implies that through action you can learn to discount what might have been going on and 
reach an answer to the question as to what is going on (i.e ‘what is the story?’).  Reducing 
equivocality suggests that action does not clarify by allowing you to eliminate lack of clarity 
but that action clarifies by shaping what it is that you are attending to and in the doing, shapes 
what is going on. 
As found in Weick’s (1979) classic ‘enactment-selection-retention’ organizing model, 
the sensemaking process rests on a combination of both thinking and action. People make 
sense of equivocal inputs by thinking about or ‘reading’ situations in order to generate richer 
and deeper interpretations as to what is happening. This is reflected in the advice that to deal 
with increasingly complex environments, you need to ‘complicate yourself’ so that the 
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variety of the thinking matches that of the environment (Weick, 1979; Gioia, 2006; Tsoukas 
and Dooley, 2011).   On other occasions, people make sense mainly by acting first. That is, 
by doing, people shape the displays to which they are attending, they enact their environment 
(not enthink) and then subsequently make sense of the information in which they have had a 
large hand in creating.  However, as Colville (1994: 219-220) reminds us, “… in every 
situation there is an element of both/and.  The trick is to combine them and find a balance 
that works….”.  Weick’s (1979) organizing model draws attention to this both/and quality by 
tying enactment (action) and selection (i.e. thinking) together through the sensemaking 
process.   
That balance is made more difficult by the role of the third organizing process – 
retention.  Retention is the remembrance of past sensemaking.  This is a retrospective process 
in which, with history in hand, when people select interpretations for present enactments they 
usually see in the present what they have seen before (Weick, 1979: 201).  The process is 
explained by the organization of past experience in the retention system, in which memories 
of past sensemaking are conceptualised as categories or types of activities.  From this, we 
note that the answer to the question ‘what is organized in an organization’ (Bittner, 1965) is 
common-sense-making categories that are the products of prior organizing and sensemaking 
processes.  “For an activity to be said to be organized, it implies that types of behavior in 
types of situation are systematically connected to types of actors” (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002: 
573, emphasis in original).  In the interests of generalizing, these categories are more abstract 
and broadly defined than the moments of sensemaking that gave rise to them.   
William James (1890/1957: 108-109) captures this process in his observation that “the 
intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order for the 
perceptual order in which his experience originally comes”.  The effect of this substitution is 
to bias the way in which organizing reduces equivocality such that concepts dominate 
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percepts in shaping sensemaking. Where the conceptual types do not differ from current 
experience, this does not adversely affect the appropriateness of the sense made.  However if 
they ‘differ from’, then it will become problematic in that we will fail to see change in an 
emerging ‘present’. “Organizing and sensemaking turn out to have a closer affinity than is 
signified by the word ‘and’……Sensemaking makes organizing possible” (Weick, 2001: 95).  
The way in which individuals’ perceptions become meshed in more collective conceptions in 
search of shared meaning is found in the relationship between frames and cues.  
  
Frames and cues 
The word ‘frame’ is frequently evoked to refer to these categories of organized experience 
(Goffman, 1974) and it is through these that current activities are singled out for closer 
attention and are understood.  Placing stimuli or current cues into a frame provides a 
reference which enables people to “comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate 
and predict” (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988: 51).  As Weick (1995: 111) further elaborates, 
“Frames tend to be past moments of socialization and cues tend to be present moments of 
experience.  If a person can construct a relation between these two moments, meaning is 
created. This means that the content of sensemaking is to be found in the frames and 
categories that summarise past experience, in the cues and labels that snare specifics of 
present experience, and the ways these two settings of experience are connected”.   
The flexibility of frame or organizational routine tends to be down-played in the change 
literature at the expense of its tendency to generate stability and be a source of inertia 
(Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch, 1974).  Feldman and Pentland (2003: 101) have countered 
such interpretations in reconceptualizing organizational routines as a source of flexibility and 
change, by distinguishing between two aspects said to comprise routines: “The ostensive 
aspect is the ideal or schematic form of a routine.  It is the abstract, generalized idea of the 
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routine, or the routine in principle.  The performative aspect of the routine consists of specific 
actions, by specific people, in specific places and times. It is the routine in practice.”  In their 
view, both are necessary for an organizational routine to exist and for understanding the 
relationship between variability and stability which underpins change in organizing.   
Building on this, Farjoun (2010) has argued that organizational change should be 
conceptualised as a duality (containing the seeds of change and stability) rather than the more 
usual dualist conception, in which change and stability are understood as opposites.  In 
making his case, Farjoun notes that stability of outcome or performance in dynamic settings 
is not self-sustaining but requires internal variation and effort, such that it is always tentative 
and requires explanation (ibid: 200).  However, there is a limit to the ability to adapt to 
change beyond a certain level and to deal with novelty (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  That is, 
“….a system may not be able to respond to some qualitative changes outside a certain range 
and, thus, allows the rigidity associated with exploitation to sneak back in.” (Farjoun, 2010: 
209) In such circumstances, routines become constraining rather than enabling and the inertia 
which has snuck back in becomes a problem requiring change, i.e. change that involves the 
replacement or addition of routines rather than the modification or adjustments of what is 
already there. 
This draws attention to the adequacy of the sensemaking process that is initiated to deal 
with an interruption: an interruption to the thinking–as-usual which, as W.I. Thomas (quoted 
by Schutz, 1964: 96) put it, “interrupts the flow of habit and gives rise to changed conditions 
of consciousness and practice”.  It is about the ability of people to make sense of equivocality 
and to repair a situation by establishing shared, plausible meanings.  Maitlis and Sonnenshein 
(2010) similarly argue that the bracketing of cues from the environment and their 
interpretation through salient frames is central to the development of plausible meaning. 
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Sensemaking is thus about connecting frames and cues to create an account of what is going 
on.   
Maitlis and Sonnenshein (2010) link the literature of crisis sensemaking and change in 
sensemaking by referring to the elusiveness of shared meanings.  However, one area which 
remains unaddressed is the finer distinction between frames and cues as revealed in the 
relationship between thinking/ concepts and acting/ percepts.  It is our contention that the 
adequacy of sensemaking and its ability to furnish a useful account of what is going on is 
restricted under conditions of dynamic complexity.  The main constraint lies with the frames 
which are comprised of past moments of sensemaking.  That is, if sensemaking comprises a 
balance of thinking (or conceiving) about situations and of acting (or perceiving), then over 
time in the process of reducing equivocality, the balance shifts towards conceptual thinking at 
the expense of perceptual acting.  Thus, the historical frames that comprise the organizational 
retention system over the processes of enactment and selection,  start to exert more influence 
– believing is seeing (Weick, 1979; Gioia, 2006) – and novel cues tend not to be noticed let 
alone interpreted or acted upon (Jeong and Brower, 2007). 
Frames shape what is bracketed and deemed worthy of further attention but they also 
leave out much else which may be cues in other frames, as we fail to notice that we have 
failed to notice as we have become too familiar with what surrounds us.   The suicide attack 
on the Twin Towers in New York, known as 9/11, was a revelation and what it painfully 
revealed was that the assumptions on which CT had operated had failed to change in line with 
changing circumstances.  As we shall see in the next section, our case organization, the MPS, 
responded to the events of 9/11 by creating a novel frame or routine to provide organized 
sensemaking for a situation they had not yet encountered.  
In sum, the construction of ‘plausible accounts of equivocal situations’ is often treated as 
the interpretive work of sensemaking (Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2012; Weick, 2012).  
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However, novelty in the form of dynamic complexity poses problems for such sensemaking 
and organizing.  It does so by raising doubts as to the sensibility of relying on the 
sensemaking expedient of reducing equivocality by drawing on frames borne of yesterday to 
guide today’s conduct.  Under such circumstances, a sensible event is no longer one that has 
happened before and may even be a pathological handicap.  This is why organizations are 
increasingly surprised by novel events. 
If there is an inherent danger in conceptions borne of yesterday failing to keep up with a 
dynamic present, then there are also dangers of translating percepts into concepts for as Kant 
(quoted by Blumer, 1969: 168) puts it, “Perception without conception is blind; conception 
without perception is empty.”  Both lead to an increase in equivocality which is the antithesis 
of organizing and sensemaking.  Both can also lead to error and disaster. Organizing and 
sensemaking allow us to theorize how such events happen, and also suggest how the risk of 
these consequences can be ameliorated.  What remains open for question is what happens to 
organizing and sensemaking after such change is made in response to a crisis.   
 
Methodology and methods 
Our methodology is underpinned by the assumptions that humans are interpreters and thus in 
effect, creators of their own social worlds such that reality is said to be a social construction, 
built out of meanings which are social in origin and in persistence (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  These assumptions lend well to researching sensemaking 
and underlie our qualitative case analysis of the Official Inquiry into the shooting of Jean 
Charles de Menezes, conducted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
i
.  
The use of official inquiry reports as source data for empirical study is well established 
through a robust body of literature (for example, Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Gephart, 1997; 
Weick, 1990: Weick and Sutcliffe, 2003).  As Brown (2004: 95) points out, such texts act as 
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“locales for the conduct of primary research”.  Although one must be cautious in over-
generalizing from single-case accounts, such empirical studies are not only necessary 
ingredients for developing more general theories of behavior but also provide rich resources 
bridging empirical evidence and theory-building (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Siggelkow, 
2007; Suddaby, 2006; Weick et al, 2005). 
The Official Inquiry into Mr de Menezes’ death was documented in what became known 
as the IPCC Stockwell One Report (2007)
ii
 and provides our primary data source.  This kind 
of incident was and still is exceptional in the UK (see Discussion section below) and in case 
study terms, exemplifies an extreme event from which much may be learnt (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  We use the IPCC Stockwell One Report (2007) (from hereon called ‘the Report’) as 
an authoritative account of the events leading up to the shooting of Mr de Menezes.  Such 
authority rests on its constitutional primacy together with the fact that the content of this 
report, in terms of timelines and recorded explanations, have remained uncontested
iii
.   
It is an unusual inquiry case example to the extent that this was a highly complex 
situation with a variety of different stakeholder interests.  However, unlike the investigation 
of the heat wave disaster in France (Boudes and Laroche, 2009) where there were seven 
different reports into the disaster, there is only one report of the actual Stockwell incident:  
this is considered to be ‘the definitive’ (i.e. legally-upheld) statement of what happened. 
Unlike other inquiry report analyses (for example, of the Barings case by Brown [2005] or 
the Board of Banking Supervision’s by Magee, Milliken and Lurie [2009]), we chose not to 
include media coverage as data as our focus is on the operational/organizational details of 
what happened (and on which all further Crown actions were based).  
 
Case data  
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All details of the incident in this article are taken from the Report from which we have 
been granted unrestricted permission to reproduce extracts. The IPPC investigators
iv
 were 
effectively granted police officer status in order to conduct their enquiries such that key 
participants were interviewed under caution and under oath, and no officer involved gave any 
subsequent press or other interviews.  For this reason, it was not possible to gather further 
data through interviews with key participants.  However, as our aim was to make sense of 
their sensemaking rather than to seek out ‘the truth’ of who said or did what to whom, this 
was not problematic. Fortuitously, we have also been able to add to the robustness of our 
analysis by gaining agreement to our findings from senior members of the MPS. This is an 
important methodological point.  While our primary data have been collected and synthesised 
by others, our analysis and theorizing remain grounded in this evidence (Bryant and 
Charmaz, 2007) and has been verified by participants.    
Such is the nature of counter terrorism policing with high levels of security, secrecy and 
confidentiality embedded in its operations, this Report offers a rare but valuable insight into 
sensemaking and organizing in a fast-moving, dynamic and potentially life-threatening 
environment.  Given the very public nature of the shooting on a commuter train, over 650 
people took part in the IPCC investigation by the team of investigators, which comprised the 
IPCC Chair, two former Detective Chief Superintendents appointed as senior investigators, 
six trained major incident room staff and 17 investigators.  During the 5 month investigation, 
they gathered and analysed 1700 pieces of evidence from police, forensic experts and civilian 
witnesses, including: approximately 890 sworn witness statements, voice recordings, CCTV 
footage of events and written logs together with interviews under caution with fifteen officers 
who were directly involved in the incident (see IPCC website for further details
v
).  Written 
logs provide a distinguishing feature of the data in this case:  for example, a Detective 
Inspector wrote formal logs of decisions taken by the Designated Senior Officer (DSO) in 
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charge, and also of meetings and events taking place in Room 1600 that day; and surveillance 
logs were kept at the Observation Posts.   
The Report is not written in terms of what a layperson might understand to be ‘a whole 
story’ of what happened.  Instead, the document effectively provides the evidence-base, 
across 170-pages, clustered into 19 different Sections from which its authors then draw their 
24 pages of conclusions, and make recommendation to the CPS in the final Section 20.  Each 
of the 20 Sections comprises numbered bullet points (with usually only one, two or three 
sentences in each) and all of the key actors are either anonymised or given their coded 
designations, e.g., Trojan 80 or Charlie 12, where Trojan indicates a particular tactical 
(firearms) advisor and Charlie means a specialist firearms officer (see Table 1 for a glossary).  
-------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------- 
Data analysis 
Langley (1999) identifies seven generic strategies for the analysis of process data and 
elaborates key characteristics and implications associated with each approach.  These are not 
exhaustive, can be used in combination and should be considered alongside Thorngate’s 
proviso about commensurate complexity (Weick, 1979: 35), necessitating inevitable tradeoffs 
between generality, simplicity and accuracy in inquiry. With this as our guide, we took up 
Langley’s central challenge of “moving from a shapeless data spaghetti toward some kind of 
theoretical understanding that does not betray the richness, dynamism and complexity of the 
data but that is understandable and potentially useful to others” (ibid: 695).  
Given the nature of the Report, first we prepared a case study document based on our 
initial readings which effectively provides a succinct summation of the case (see next 
section).  The Report itself did not examine the meanings of key words – neither meanings 
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given nor meanings taken or received – beyond the explanations given by key actors.  Hence 
between us, we ultimately read the Report over thirty times in classic, iterative, grounded, 
qualitative data analysis mode (Charmaz, 2006; Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2006; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994), oscillating between theory and data, coding, comparing, and categorising 
our data as well as discussing and cross-checking with each other at each stage in the process. 
From our initial reading of the Report, we had each independently identified 
headings/potential codings from which we collectively created an initial framework of broad 
first-order codes (Van Maanen, 1979).  In so doing, we faced many of the common 
challenges of process data analysis including complexity, multiplicity and ambiguity, as well 
as variable time and space, precision, duration and relevance by Langley (1999).  We then 
agreed that the third author (himself, a former police officer with counter terrorism 
experience) would undertake the next step, sifting backwards and forwards through the 
different sections to glean information from the accounts and witness statements, effectively 
developing and fleshing out the case.  From this, we collated codes into themed clusters, i.e. 
first order coding which reflected the complexity of qualitative data analysis (Pratt, 2009) 
(see Table 2). 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
-------------------------------------------- 
Providing a graphic to represent analysis of such data (i.e. deeply intertwined and 
dynamically inter-changing) in what is essentially a 2-D form is particularly challenging.  In 
an endeavour to reflect some of this, we coded the changing context enacted in a process of 
actors enacting their environment (Weick, 1979) as the ‘ecology of organization’.  The 
“ecology of organization” or context essential to making sense of behaviour (Staw and 
Salancik, 1977: 4) was undoubtedly an important element in our data analysis in terms of 
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content and process.  Fairhurst (2009: 1623) notes: “With a discursive and social 
constructionist view, a multi-layered and dynamic view of context is captured when we are 
able to demonstrate how individual, dyad or group, organizational and socio-historical 
influences reflexively interrelate at particular moments in time”. We concur with her 
ambition to develop an integrative analysis of action in context or “space of action” (Daudi, 
1986, cited by Fairhurst, 2009: 1623) and to that end, draw attention to points of sensemaking 
which may evidence “discrepant sensemaking” (Brown, Stacey and Nandakumar, 
2008:1035). 
Moving from first-order to second-order coding, we all reread the Report once more to 
‘scrutinize’ the data, in effect, checking out relationships between codes to help deepen and 
strengthen the conceptual linkages representing these data.  This phase of our analysis of the 
Report enabled us to develop second-order codes or concepts: that is, “…those notions used 
by the fieldworker to explain the patterning of the first-order data.  Descriptively, many 
second-order concepts are simply statements about relationships between certain properties 
observed to covary in the setting and may occasionally converge with first-order 
interpretations” (Van Maanen, 1979: 541).  From this analysis, Operation Kratos emerged as 
key to the sense being made by police officers in this case. Evidenced through both explicit 
and implicit use of language, artefacts and behaviours, we see the power of a tool or frame to 
influence assumptions, expectations and behaviour such that the call to ‘stop him’ was 
understood within the Kratos frame with regrettable, lethal consequences.    
 
Case context and synopsis 
Preparations by the police service to counter the threat of suicide bombers 
Suicide bombing was largely unrecognized in the West as a terrorist strategy until: 
 On 11 September 2001, over 2,000 people were killed by two aircraft flying into 
the Twin Towers in New York City.  This led to the plausibility of a passenger 
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aircraft carrying a full load of aviation fuel effectively becoming a bomb, and the 
hijackers controlling the aircraft being regarded as suicide bombers.  This became 
known as 9/11. 
 On 11 March 2004, the Madrid train bombings killed more than 190 people.  
Detonation was by remote control:  seven suspects blew themselves up following 
confrontation by the police. 
 On 7 July 2005 (known as 7/7), the London public transport system bombings 
killed 52 people and the four suicide bombers, as well as injuring 700 more. Then 
two weeks later:  
 On 21 July 2005, four attempted synchronised bomb attacks disrupted part of 
London's public transport system in Central London. The detonators failed to 
trigger the main charges and the suspects escaped.  This was the day before the 
Stockwell incident. 
 
This series of events created the context in which the London MPS CT unit was working.  
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, the MPS reviewed its strategies to combat the 
increased threat of suicide bombings in the UK by conducting research throughout the world 
to determine appropriate tactics.  In October 2003, a draft paper entitled ‘Operation Kratos 
People’ (Kratos is the Greek God of War) was circulated to all 43 police services in England 
and Wales. The paper noted when facing a suicide bomber, “It may not be appropriate to issue 
a warning, the shot may be to the head to avoid detonating an explosive device and [that] a 
decision to shoot may have to be taken on the command of a senior officer who has sufficient 
information to justify use of lethal force” (IPCC, 2007: 41).   
The following section provides material selected from our original summation of the 
case, compiled from the Report, which is particularly pertinent to this article. 
Selected extract from the IPCC Stockwell One Report (2007) 
 
All text in italics is quoted from the Report and followed by page number in brackets. The 
non-italicised text reflects our combined first reading, and has been confirmed by MPS senior 
officers.  Apostrophes were used in the Report for direct quotation from officers, hence are 
also used in our text. 
The Briefing 
01:00hrs Commander P received a telephone call requesting her to report for duty at New 
Scotland Yard (NSY) at 07:00hrs as the DSO to ‘do Kratos Commander’ (49). 
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05:00hrs She arrived at her office and briefed herself from documents and training 
presentations on Operations Kratos and Operation C (49). 
06:04hrs  Operation Theseus had commenced:  i.e. a strategy for the safe containment and 
identification of all people leaving 21 Scotia Road, such that the premises at Scotia Road 
were under observation. 
06:50hrs With officers from CO19, Charlie 2 went to the armoury at Leman Street Police 
Station, and amongst the weaponry he booked out, was a Glock 9mm handgun loaded with 17 
rounds of 124 grain hollow point ammunition. Charlie 2 records that the ammunition had 
been specially authorised for Operation Theseus, due to the nature of threat that existed and 
that they had to face, i.e. armed terrorists and suicide bombers. Charlie 2 describes the need 
for the ammunition for the immediate incapacitation to stop a suicide bomber (90). 
The assumption here is that officers would face a substantial threat and the issue of 
specialist ammunition was consistent with the threat being that of a suicide bomber and 
delivery of a ‘critical shot’, should it be authorised by the DSO. 
07:45hrs Charlie 2 and other specialist firearms officers were briefed by Trojan 84.  The 
officers were told they must trust the information coming from Room 1600 and that the 
officers might use unusual tactics and also that they might be asked to do something they had 
not done before.  Charlie 2 states the information he received at the briefing he took to mean 
that he may have to face a suicide bomber (91). 
The instruction to ‘trust the information’ from Room 1600 and the term ‘unusual tactics’ 
were also consistent with a Kratos operation, although no officer in the UK had yet delivered 
a ‘critical shot’.  
08:45hrs Charlie 2 with other officers were given a further briefing by DCI C who was 
operating as ground commander for the DSO, Commander P. The briefing gave details, of the 
7/7 bombings, the 21/7 incidents and information concerning the two suspects Hussain 
OSMAN and the second suspect. DCI C stated that the men were prepared deadly and 
determined suicide bombers and they were “up for it”. He also informed the officers that 
devices could be concealed on the body and triggered easily (91). 
Charlie 2 then went with other officers to a holding position in a police vehicle. He stated 
that, at this stage, ‘I believed that it was very likely that I would be asked to intercept deadly 
and determined terrorist suicide bombers’ (91).  
For information: some have technical posts e.g. Trojan 84 or Charlie 2 so these are pre-
known and would have been used as part of their communication. The named officers were 
Special Branch officers whose identities were disguised after the event. 
09:33hrs Mr de Menezes was seen to leave 21 Scotia Road. 
 
 
The Identification 
09.36hrs  Mr de Menezes walked towards Tulse Hill and boarded a Number 2 bus.  Charlie 2 
stated that he heard over the Cougar radio that …… he heard over the radio the surveillance 
officer saying [of the man on the bus] ‘this was definitely our man’ (91). 
Charlie 2 has now heard a positive identification over the radio and whist not coming 
directly from Room 1600, it was consistent with the preparation he had received. 
Shortly before 09:39hrs ‘James’ saw Mr de Menezes walking in Tulse Hill and identified 
him as ‘possibly identical’ to the subject [Osman] Nettle Tip.  Another officer, ‘Harry’ was 
not able to identify the male as being identical to the first suspect Osman (55). 
There is equivocality from ‘James’ but ‘Harry’ is clear he was unable to identify the 
suspect. 
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At about 09:47hrs ‘Ivor’ [now on the bus and answering a phone call asking him about the 
suspect’s identity] ….stated that he could not positively identify the male as the first suspect 
Hussain Osman, (Nettle Tip) (56).  
Trojan 80’s loggist notes ‘Not ident male as above discounted’ …and ‘this is consistent 
with the uncertainty of the surveillance team regarding the identification …….’ (56). 
09:47hrs  ‘Laurence’ [observing first a side view of his face, then but ‘a full frontal view of 
his face for a split second’ as he drove past] told ‘James’ and ‘Ken’ ‘he did not believe that 
the person was identical to Nettle Tip’ (56-57). 
Hotel 11 also saw him get off the bus, and then rejoin the queue and use his mobile 
phone. From a distance of 10 metres, Hotel 11 considered the person to be a similar likeness 
to the photograph he had seen previously (57). 
…… ‘Pat’ [surveillance monitor] then informed [Commander P] “it is him, the man is off 
the bus. They think it is him and he is very, very jumpy.” This is recorded within her loggist’s 
notes (57). 
‘Pat’ from Room 1600 was relaying information to and from officers engaged on the 
operation. He appears to have paid attention to comments from the surveillance officers that 
tended to confirm identification but those disconfirming identification were not relayed to 
Commander P.  
Charlie 2 heard it said that the man was ‘nervous, acting strangely and was very twitchy’ 
(91). 
Commander P sought additional confirmation regarding identification and through ’Pat’ 
asked the Surveillance team to give a percentage indication of how certain they were…… 
‘James’ received this message and considered this to be ……. impossible to answer. He 
informed ‘Pat’ that when he briefly saw the male at 0939 he thought he was a ‘good possible’ 
for the subject ‘Nettle Tip’ but since that time none of his team had been able to get a close 
look at him (58). 
Although ‘Pat’ does not himself recall saying this, Commander P and others …… heard 
‘Pat’ say words to the effect that ‘They cannot give a percentage but they believe it is Nettle 
Tip’ (58). 
DCI C was at the TA Centre when he heard over the surveillance radio that the person 
being followed on the bus had been identified as Nettle Tip. He was in no doubt this was a 
positive identification. (57). 
The CO19 team……were travelling towards Stockwell on blue lights and sirens (59). 
 
The Interception  
Commander P in consultation with Trojan 80 decided that ‘the subject believed to be Nettle 
Tip cannot be allowed to enter the tube system. He must be arrested before by SO19’ 
(Decision Log 16). Her decision was communicated directly to both Trojan 80, who was next 
to her and to DCI C who had an open phone link. Central 1614 entered Room 1600 and 
heard the surveillance monitor [officer in room 1600 providing verbal updates] commenting 
that the man under surveillance was on a bus. He then heard he was getting off the bus and 
the surveillance monitor asking Senior officers whether he should be stopped. He states that 
Commander P and a senior SO13 officer shouted, ‘yes stop him’ (59-60). 
10:05hrs  Charlie 2 also states he heard that the ‘suspect’ had got off the bus and was 
heading towards Stockwell Underground station. Charlie 2 then heard over the radio, ‘stop 
him from getting on the tube, he must not get onto the tube’. The officer believed it was a 
relayed instruction from the DSO (91). 
It is clear at this stage that Charlie 2, having travelled at speed to the underground station, 
now believed (as instructed) the information relayed to him about the identification of Mr de 
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Menezes as the suspect and further believed the instruction to stop him was given from 
within the meaning of a Kratos operation. 
Charlie 2 drew his handgun as he reached the train and …..  saw a person he believed to 
be a surveillance officer point at a male…… Mr de Menezes stood up and was grabbed by the 
surveillance officer who pushed him back onto the seat. Charlie 2 was convinced Mr de 
Menezes was a suicide bomber about to detonate a bomb. He states that he honestly believed 
that unless he acted immediately everyone present was about to die. …… He held his gun to 
Mr de Menezes’ head and fired (64). 
When interviewed Commander P was asked to explain the word “Stop” and her response 
was that “Stop” is a common word in policing terms and it was meant as “stop and detain” 
(134). 
 
Discussion 
The Jean Charles de Menezes case throws into sharp relief the processes and 
consequences when an organization introduces a novel routine to cope with a potential novel 
situation.  Our analysis reveals how the degree of change required in this case lies beyond the 
elasticity of an existing frame or routine. It also draws attention to how an extant frame does 
not necessarily break, i.e. stop, in the face of new cues but instead lingers on in a process of 
‘going’ while being overlain by a new ‘becoming’.  In so doing, this also highlights the 
shifting balance of influence between conceiving and perceiving which has significant impact 
on participants’ identities.  This discussion section will first address frames and cues, and 
then consider their influence in the becomings and goings of change.  Our final section 
considers the implications which these processes have for identities and action which in turn 
draws us back to foundational principles of sensemaking. Throughout this, we retain an 
awareness of how sensemaking requires us to “stay in contact with context” (Weick, 2009: 
265). 
Frames and cues 
The answer to Goffman’s (1974: 4) question, what is going on here? hangs on the 
ongoing stream of experience, how it is punctuated to form moments or cues and the frame 
through which the moments are understood.  This is the process by which events (be)come 
into being for organizational members and how we make sense by endowing experience with 
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meaning (Bruner, 1990).  This is a conservative process which tends to be shaped by ‘what 
has gone on in the past’, with pre-existing frames providing not only guides for interpretation 
but also for action and emplotment (Czarniawska, 2008).  Hence for sensemakers in that 
context, a sensible event often resembles one that has happened before.   The question then 
arises as to how people in organizations recognize changing circumstances and take them into 
account:  that is, how do they deal with novelty and the surprise of the unexpected and what 
impact does this have on subsequent organizing and sensemaking?   
With particular regard to the CT context, as former director of GCHQ David Omand 
(2010) put it, “What we prepare for, we deter. So what we experience by way of events is 
alas what we have not prepared for”.  This was evidenced through the 9/11 Commission 
Report (2004) which showed how CT agencies were prepared for and on the alert for signs of 
the past; unprepared for and unaware of signals of an emerging, changing present.  The 
Report concluded that the attacks of 9/11 revealed four kinds of failure – in imagination, 
policy, capabilities and management (ibid: 339) – reserving its most stinging criticism for a 
failure in organizational rather than individual imagination.  Imagination is not a gift usually 
associated with bureaucracies, nevertheless the Commission notes “it is crucial to find ways 
of routinising even bureaucratizing the exercise of imagination” (ibid: 334).  
In effect, what the 9/11 Commission concluded was that the frames that reflected the 
organization of/for CT had become grounded and routinised to the extent that they did not 
notice weak signals in the environment (Vaughan, 1996; Turner and Pidgeon 1997).  
‘Operation Kratos People’ was built on this vicarious learning from 9/11 in an endeavour to 
provide a new routine for handling the novel situation of ‘suicide bombing’ which had not yet 
been experienced in the UK.  In this way, a new frame becomes a resource by providing a 
recipe for interpretation and action, described in this case as a new tool.  We use this 
descriptor as it resonates better with the language of practice where managers and police 
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officers talk of operational tools rather than routines.  The common thread which interweaves 
them both is that they serve as framing devices for action.   
The briefing of specialist firearms officers by Trojan 84 served to reinforce the belief that 
they were dealing with a suicide bomber and that they were in a Kratos situation.  Although 
never announced formally as a Kratos operation, there were many cues documented in the 
Report (see Case Context and Synopsis above) which implied that it was, namely:  
 the specialist ammunition for immediate incapacitation;  
 the appointment of DSO with the authority to order a critical shot;  
 firearms officers being told that they “must trust” (IPCC 207: 91) the information 
coming from the Control Room which profoundly changed the ‘normal rule’ for them, 
away from their being legally responsible for the decision to shoot, to dependence on 
the Control Room for that instruction;  
  their being told that they may have to use “unusual tactics” and;   
 that they may have to do something they had not done before.   
 
Individually each of these indicators points to Kratos.  Taken collectively and in relation 
to this briefing at this time and in this context, those briefed i.e., those who fired the fatal 
shots, began to believe this is a Kratos operation.  For example, as ‘William’ (member of the 
Firearms team) put it when discussing final moments preceding the killing, ‘the tone of voice 
and urgency of this radio transmission, combined with all the intelligence meant to me that he 
must be stopped immediately and at any cost.’  He explains that together with the 
intervention of the DSO and advice emanating from the Control Room, ‘this all leads me to 
believe this to be a KRATOS incident if the male did not comply immediately with police 
actions or requirements.’ (IPCC 2007: 61).  This was underscored by a further briefing by 
DCI C who talked of “determined suicide bombers”, and said that “devices could be 
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concealed on the body and triggered easily” (IPCC 2007: 91).  Expectations are being created 
here that will drive subsequence interpretations:  a case of believing is seeing (Gioia, 2006:  
Weick, 1979). 
The momentary awareness for those being briefed makes most plausible sense by 
believing it is a Kratos situation which they are looking at and against which they orient their 
action. The original strategy of a safe containment which those involved knew as routine 
from ‘past moments’ had fallen while Kratos has been ‘behaviourally defined’, even though 
not officially named. Furthermore, Kratos was a new tool and although it is based on recent 
past moments, none of those moments have been experienced by the people involved in this 
case.  The plan has never been operationalized and, as we see in this case, a lack of 
prototypical past moments can prolong the search for meaning (Weick, 1995: 111). 
 
Becomings and goings 
In their reworking of the concept of change, Tsoukas and Chia (2002: 568) draw attention 
to how by reversing ontological priorities from stability to change (process), this sensitises us 
to see that change is potentially there, if only we choose to look for it.  Thus, organizations 
are always in ongoing process, as conveyed by the term ‘organizational becoming’.  
Pettigrew similarly observed that human conduct is perpetually in a process of becoming, 
thus the aim for any student of change or process analyst is to “catch reality in flight” (1997: 
33). 
Our case exemplifies a situation consistent with the process perspective:  that is, through 
organizing, events are in the process of becoming and in so doing, what has gone on before 
frames that shaping process. Framing pursues experience into memory, where it is 
systematically altered to conform to our canonical representations of the social world 
(Bruner, 1990: 56).  This organization of past experience is brought to bear on current 
circumstances in the hope that a past representation will provide a plausible answer to what 
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the story is, or what is going on. This is why a sensible event is one that resembles something 
that has happened before and why history is crucial to understanding the process of how 
events are ushered into existence (Weick, 1995).  In order to make sense of what is going on 
amidst this ongoing stream of experience, people have to interrupt that stream to step aside 
and reflect back on what it is that has just happened.   
It took 33 minutes between Mr de Menezes leaving his flat and being shot, an intense 
period of very fast-moving action.  Two frames are at play in this situation – the old and the 
new (i.e. Kratos) – and remain provisional amidst the search for confirmation of the suspect’s 
identification.  Without an identification of the suspect, this complicates the frames in use 
which in turn both affects and effects what cues are seen and meanings ascribed to them, and 
ultimately shapes action which follows. This example speaks to Tsoukas and Chia’s (2002: 
580) encouragement to develop our understanding of being and becoming, or organization 
and organizing, and adds both a temporal and a plural dimension to this.  In addition, we 
recognize that the process of becoming overlays a process of going, which both take time to 
come and go, which also happens at different speeds.   As Weick (2012: 148) notes, 
“Organizational becoming (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002) is a recurring perspective…but 
becoming is actually becomings and becomings unfold at different speeds.  Faster becomings 
provide frames within which slower becomings gain their meaning.”   
It is not just process researchers who endeavour to catch reality in flight but it is also 
those officers involved in trying to make sense of a fast-flowing stream of experience:  quite 
literally, on the run.  Thus, sensemaking is in the nature of the reflective glance (Weick, 
1979: 194), informed by previous efforts of organizing and retained as frames of organized 
past experience (Goffman, 1974: 4). Frames shape not only what aspects of the stream will be 
noticed – current cues – but also the meaning that will be ascribed to them and with that, the 
enactor’s identity and actions undertaken, to which we now turn. 
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Novel identities 
In discussing frames and cues, becomings and goings, it is easy to lose sight of the people 
who carry frames, notice cues, and endeavour to make sense of what is happening and take 
action as a consequence of this process.  Identity is a core property of sensemaking because 
“Depending on who I am, my definition of what is “out there” will also change…… But the 
direction of causality flows just as often from the situation to a definition of self as it does the 
other way.” (Weick, 1995: 20).  Cunliffe and Coupland (2012) argue that these images of 
identity are not confined to cognitive representations and that sensemaking includes 
embodied efforts to work out ‘who we are’ and ‘what we should do’.  Notions of embodied 
sensemaking infused with identity are particularly germane when action is not only swift but, 
as seen in this case, where bodily movements and their relationship to the weapons they were 
carrying are of central importance to next acts (Goffman, 1974).   
This suggests that definitions of the situation are bound up with definitions of identity.  
Organizational identity comprises not only beliefs, thoughts and claims about ‘who we are as 
an organization’ but also ‘what we do’ (Nag, Corley and Gioia, 2007).  Identity is a concept 
that organizations enact and as such, is relatively underdeveloped as an area of research in 
general and particularly in its relationship to sensemaking (Gioia, Price, Hamilton and 
Thomas, 2010).  Our paper resonates with work encouraged by Weick et al (2005) to show 
not only how sensemaking is more boldly meshed with identity, but also give more insight as 
to how the enactment of identity is tied to operating frames within which cues are interpreted. 
The pace or momentum by which circumstances were happening also increased once the 
suspect left the house which in turn, further heightened anxiety. Communication and 
coordination and hence organization (Taylor and Van Every 2000) become equivocal as 
different parties report various degrees of confirmation about whether the person being 
followed is indeed the suspected suicide bomber, Osman.  The original police operation 
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instigated by Commander M was to maintain surveillance at 21 Scotia Road and to ‘safely 
contain’ anyone leaving the premises. Like many organizational situations where contrarian 
events take place, that falters with the departure of the suspect before the arrival of CO19 
officers. Circumstances and contexts are moving towards a definition of the situation that 
makes sense in terms of the Kratos frame for CO19 officers.  However, the pre-existing 
firearms officer identity is also potentially in play, such that there is equivocality as to which 
identity is more appropriate to the situation.  Without the confirmed identification of the 
suspect and without the command to shoot, what was going on was a routine counter terrorist 
operation.  There was an extant organizational frame that had been honed and practised over 
a number of years and was deeply embedded in the identity of firearms officers.   
Given that there will be differences in those circumstances, adjustments or change to 
maintain a stable outcome will often be realised through the ongoing variations which emerge 
frequently, even imperceptibly, in the slippages and improvisations of everyday activity 
(Orlikowski, 1996: 88).  This frame and routine were deeply engrained in firearms officer 
training and institutionally embedded, effectively providing their ‘tool’ for dealing with 
firearms incidents.  As servants of the Crown and in the exercise of their sworn duty to 
protect life and property, UK police officers ultimately hold individual responsibility and 
accountability, and use autonomy to act as they deem necessary given their judgement of the 
threat they face.  Thus this frame had taken on the quality of, if not exactly a taken-for-
granted template, then one that was well rehearsed, routinized and reliable
vi
.  
However, it was adjudged that the routine could not accommodate the changes 
anticipated to deal with the novelty of a suicide bombing.  The difference between past 
frames and current cues was of an order that necessitated a novel routine rather than an 
amendment to the extant one for handling terrorist attack.  Within the protocols of a Kratos 
operation, responsibility for the authority to take the ‘critical shot’ is shifted from the 
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firearms officer to the DSO who has to satisfy him or herself that they have ‘sufficient 
information to justify use of lethal force’ (IPCC 2007: 41).  This was a radically new frame 
which removed the decision and accountability for action to open fire away from firearms 
officers and to the DSO such that the role of the firearms officer then becomes ‘fire when 
instructed’ by a DSO, rather than resting on the judgement of a firearms officer in the field:  a 
radically new identity for CO19 officers.   
In sum, our case clearly illustrates how novel cues had to be translated and stabilised into 
a novel routine that not only would notice cues but also provide guides to action so they may 
be ‘made sense of’.  There was a frame borne of historical routine running alongside a novel 
frame to deal with a novel situation and as yet un-experienced by those involved here.  This 
meant that both frames were in play and availing as a resource for sensemaking. This lead to 
two plausible accounts as to what was going on which further complicated matters in as much 
as the identities and the respective definitions as to what cues ‘out there’ meant and what 
behaviour followed also differed.   
Under Kratos, the firearms officers of CO19 had a different identity to that which 
pertained under the ‘normal’ routine for dealing with armed terrorist incidents.  This 
generated dissonance because the different identities call for different responses on their 
parts.  ‘Who is going on’ affects interpretations as to what is going and what action follows as 
a result.  The issue is not one of a lack of shared meaning as one of too many plausible 
meanings – that is, meanings that are shared out.  When the DSO issues the command ‘Stop 
him’ under a non-Kratos routine, it means ‘stop and detain him’.  This is in fact what the 
DSO said she meant.  Under Kratos, which Charlie 2 and other members of CO19 believed to 
be the case such that if directed by the DSO to fire a critical shot then they would, it meant 
something else. ‘Stop him’ seemed unequivocal:  tragically, it made fatal sense.   
 
Conclusion 
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“A central issue in sensemaking will be the ways in which people redeploy concepts 
in order to ward off blind perceptions, and redirect perceptions to ward off empty 
conceptions.”  Weick (2012: 151) 
 
Our overarching conclusion is that the MPS redeployed concepts by creating Kratos in an 
effort to ward off the blind perceptions revealed originally in 9/11 and other counter terrorism 
events involving suicide bombers.  Organizationally they created a novel routine to deal with 
a novel situation which was adjudged beyond the scope and flexibility of extant 
organizational routines.  This was done in the anticipation of redirecting perceptions to ward 
off empty conceptions.  However, rather than reducing equivocality or clarifying the 
situation, the presence of two possible routines to handle the circumstances leads to an 
increase in equivocality.  This equivocality is generated not because of the elusiveness of 
shared or plausible meanings – rather more that the meanings were shared out and different, 
depending on which routine was judged to be relevant.  The problem was not a lack of 
plausible meaning but the presence of a number of plausible meanings. As a result, the 
answer to the questions, how does something (be)come an event for organizational members, 
what does that event mean and what should I do, are tragically different although they all 
make sense in terms of their own routine or frame.  Sensemaking is consistent in terms of 
each frame but inconsistent at the collective level of organizing.  We unpack this overarching 
conclusion in terms of its contribution to: the furtherance of organizing and sensemaking 
theory; the relevance to organizational practice, and; how it aids the development of a bridge 
between theory and practice. 
In the face of novelty, acts of meaning are more likely to detect difference thereby 
allowing us to see change rather than thoughts of meaning: ‘don’t think but look’ is the motto 
(Tsoukas and Chia, 2003).  While this sensitizes us to ‘see change’ and the ongoing process 
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of becoming, it should not be at the expense of negating the concepts and frames:  it is these 
which provide the essential stabilities which allow us to detect flow and shape the meaning of 
what is becoming.  
In the 33 minutes between the suspect leaving the house in Scotia Road and being shot a 
number of possibilities were becoming, depending on what routine was understood to be 
salient.  The circumstances were inchoate and even though still plausible, the meanings were 
equivocal.  Meanings inform and constrain identity and action (Mills, 2003).  Here we have a 
situation which exemplifies how the meaning of what is going on is tied to who is going on 
and what action follows (Brown, 2006).  Kratos gives a different identity that has different 
legal responsibilities and different action consequences for CO19 and the DSO.  From this, 
we conclude that who we are is central to sensemaking such that when novel situations give 
rise to novel routines, this can lead to different and swiftly changing identities that impact on 
meanings and action taken. Organizations not only face times of unprecedented change but in 
a more profound sense, also find out who they are and who they are becoming.  
Identity has always been important in organizing and sensemaking. Our case analysis 
reveals it to be even more critically important, and also more malleable and dynamic than has 
previously been considered.  Theoretically this points to analysis which extends beyond 
sensemaking in crisis to a more pluralistic, temporal consideration of how sensemaking is 
altered through changes that follow crisis.  In the case examined here, we see how the 
endeavour to reduce equivocality through creating Kratos ultimately had the effect of 
increasing equivocality and then led to a further crisis.   
The implications for organizational practice are considerable as they point out not only the 
difficulties of noticing and responding to dynamic complexity but also the potential effects of 
instigating changes to deal with such circumstances. The 9/11 Commission sought to 
bureaucratize imagination in order to contend with a fast-changing world that owes little to 
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yesterday. However, there is little appreciation of how this might be achieved or the 
organizational frailties which could underlie this process. Earlier drafts of this paper have 
been read by senior MPS CT officers and have struck a chord with them with regard to 
understanding organizing and making sense of the situation they faced.   
In conclusion, Corley and Gioia (2011) argue that a scholarly contribution is made by 
management academics anticipating in their theorizing what society needs to know and of 
influencing the sensegiving process as to how that knowing is received. We argue that the 
conditions that the MPS CT unit was experiencing as they organized to make sense of 
changing patterns of terrorist threat serve as a prototype of the conditions that will become 
more commonplace for organizations tomorrow. As such, the issues discussed and 
conclusions drawn speak to a much wider organizational constituency.  They also speak both 
to researchers who study sensemaking processes and to those who explore the dynamics of 
flow between becomings and goings, which advance and fade at different speeds and with 
different effects across time.  
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TABLE 1:  Selected Code Names, Abbreviations and Designations Used in This London 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Assignment  
 
Designation Code meaning 
Central Members of Special Branch working in Room 1600 on 22 July 
2005 
Charlies 
Specialist Firearms Officers 
CO19, also referred to as 
SO19 
Specialist Firearms Department 
DSO Designated Senior Officer under a Kratos Operation 
Hotels and Tangos 
UK Police Special Branch surveillance team members 
Loggists Both Commander P and Trojan 80 had loggists 
recording their decisions throughout the operation. 
Nettle Tip 
Codename for the suspect Osman 
Operation C 
Operation C was a policy written to deal with the threat of a 
suicide bomber at a pre-planned public event, for example 
Trooping the Colour (in which guards parade in front of 
Buckingham Palace). 
Room 1600  
Special Branch operations room at New Scotland Yard (NSY) 
SO13  
Anti Terrorists Branch 
SO12  
Special Branch 
TA  Centre  
Territorial Army Centre close to Scotia Rd 
Trojan Tactical Advisers – Trojan 80 was one of several who had 
central roles in this incident. 
 
Italicised abbreviations for the above can be found in the Report but are not used in this 
manuscript. 
 
                                                 
i
 The IPCC is a non-departmental public body, established in 2004 and funded by the UK Government’s Home 
Office, “by law entirely independent of the police, interest groups and political parties and whose decisions on 
cases are free from government involvement”i.  Its purpose is to ensure suitable arrangements are in place for 
dealing with complaints or allegations of misconduct against any person serving with the Police Service in 
England and Wales.  Reports are prepared by designated Investigators, in this case two recently retired 
Detective Chief Superintendents, each with over 30 years experience of police service. 
ii
 As articulated in the Report (2007: 5): “The primary purpose of the report was to meet the statutory obligations 
of the IPCC following an investigation of this kind. These are to advise the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) of 
any criminal offence that may have been committed and to provide it with the evidence necessary to come to its 
decision about any prosecution; to enable the 'responsible authorities' of the officers concerned, in this case the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), to consider what action they may 
need to take in relation to discipline or other matters; in cases of exceptional gravity such as this, to inform the 
Home Secretary of the circumstances; and finally, to assist the Coroner in relation to any Inquest.” It concludes 
that the CPS might consider criminal charges for serious offences including: Manslaughter, Abuse of Public 
Office and Attempting to Pervert the Course of Justice, as well as for breach of Health and Safety at Work Act. 
iii
 This remains the case, even though the veracity of reasons given for those explanations was later challenged 
during the prosecution of the police and the subsequent Coroner’s Inquest. 
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iv
 In this particular case, the Inquiry was led by Bob Cummins (Senior Investigating Officer) along with a 
Deputy, Steve Reynolds and his ‘team’.  Although the report does not identify the size or membership of the 
team, both named officers are former senior police officers and all team members have “powers and privileges 
of constables” (IPCC, 2007:12) in order to fulfil their brief.   
v
 www.ipcc.gov.uk  
vi
 The reliability and flexibility of the police routine is found in the fact that in 2005-2006, firearms were 
authorised for use in 18,891 police operations in England and Wales.  Of these, 14,355, operations requested an 
armed response vehicle to be sent to the scene of an emerging event in case they were called upon to make an 
armed intervention. Yet for all these armed operations in 2005-2006, firearms officers discharged their weapons 
on only 9 occasions, including the shooting of Mr de Menezes on 22
nd
 July 2005. It is also important to note that 
the UK police are not routinely armed: only 4% of serving officers are trained and authorised to carry firearms. 
